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ABSTRACT: Despite the seemingly neutral vantage of using nature for widely-distributed 
computational purposes, neither post-biological nor post-humanist teleology simply concludes 
with the real "end of nature" as entailed in the loss of the specific ontological status embedded in 
the identifier "natural." As evinced by the ecological crises of the Anthropocene—of which the 
2019 Brazil Amazon rainforest fires are only the most recent—our epoch has transfixed the 
“natural order" and imposed entropic artificial integration, producing living species that 
become “anoetic,” made to serve as automated exosomatic residues, or digital flecks. I further 
develop Gilles Deleuze’s description of control societies to upturn Foucauldian biopower, 
replacing its spacio-temporal bounds with the exographic excesses in psycho-power; culling and 
further detailing Bernard Stiegler’s framework of transindividuation and hyper-control, I 
examine how becoming-subject is predictively facilitated within cognitive capitalism and what 
Alexander Galloway terms “deep digitality.” Despite the loss of material vestiges qua 
virtualization—which I seek to trace in an historical review of industrialization to 
postindustrialization—the drive-based and reticulated "internet of things" facilitates a closed 
loop from within the brain to the outside environment, such that the aperture of thought is 
mediated and compressed. The human brain, understood through its material constitution, is 
susceptible to total datafication’s laminated process of “becoming-mnemotechnical,” and, as 
neuroplasticity is now a valid description for deep-learning and neural nets, we are privy to the 
rebirth of the once-discounted metaphor of the “cybernetic brain.” Probing algorithmic 
governmentality while posing noetic dreaming as both technical and pharmacological, I seek to 
analyze how spirit is blithely confounded with machine-thinking’s gelatinous cognition, as 
prosthetic organ-adaptation becomes probabilistically molded, networked, and agentially 
inflected (rather than simply externalized). 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It’s true that, even before control societies are fully in place, forms of 
delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also appearing. Computer 
piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nineteenth 
century called ‘sabotage’ . . . You ask whether control or communication societies 
will lead to forms of resistance that might reopen the way for a communism . . . 
The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, 
so we can elude control” (Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’).1   
As Deleuze notes in his 1992 article, “Postscript on Societies of Control,” it 
would appear that Foucault was aware of a coming shift in the way biopower 
operates and, retrospectively, we can see this in the trajectory of Discipline and 
Punish. In the very beginning of Foucault’s text, we are introduced to Robert-
François Damiens (also professedly known as “Damiens the Regicide”) at his 
execution at Place de Grève on March 2, 1757. Foucault guides us with great 
detail through a period characterized by the abrupt abandonment of judicial 
violence as a public ritualized event and its removal and relocation to invisible 
sites. At the end of Discipline and Punish, power is described as it is exercised in 
the 20th century, far more economically and efficiently, moving toward self-
disciplining behaviors.  
However, as Deleuze's prescient remark to Antonio Negri in “Control and 
Becoming” reminds us, sites of control can also function as sites of resistance, or 
as pharmakon—as both poison and remedy. Thus, while Foucault paints the 
prison as the locus for biopower, prison protest was also once the epitomal 
symbolic site for structural change—"[i]t is the prisons themselves that put up a 
resistance."2 As Deleuze remarks in Foucault, "[w]hen power becomes bio-power 
resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power that cannot be confined 
within species, environment or the paths of a particular diagram."3  
Amending Deleuze’s “control society,” where individuals are rendered 
dividuals, or entry-points for datafication, Bernard Stiegler describes how today’s 
digital industrial economy facilitates withdrawal (désaffectation), which, in turn, 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, “Control and Becoming,” in Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 177-182. 2 Jean-François Bert, ‘Ce qui résiste, c'est la prison’, Revvue du MAUSS, vol. 40, no. 2, 2012, pp. 161-172. 3 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 92. 
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generates widespread disbelief, miscreance and discredit.4 Stiegler's provocation 
to Foucault is that we must not conceive of power at simply the level of 
biological life but at the level of mind; control exists beyond the juridical and 
scientific plane and, thus, is philosophically deserving of analysis re: how control 
becomes technically embedded. From "the cloud" to "smart homes," 
articulatory architectonics prelude the total quantification and intensive 
datafication of designed ecological circuits. Datascapes allude to quantifiable 
data and reticulated technical artifacts, with tracked movements and differential 
equations annotating corporeal and cognitive labor. Deleuze’s prescient 
description of cybernetic-cum-statistical modulation has reached its pinnacle in 
our dynamic and mobile informationalized world. 
In his most recent work, Stiegler scrutinizes algorithmic governmentality, 
examining how it prompts an uncontrollable becoming of "[s]ocieties of hyper-
control,"5 or a becoming-panicked that is, inevitably, a becoming-mad, where 
noetic souls are transfixed as aggregations, or “the swarm”: homo digitalis.6 As 
individuals are disindividuated and disintegrated, the technologies of ludic 
capitalism—from the assembly line to Facebook—consult desublimation.  
As human experience is exteriorized onto digital platforms, individual and 
collective protentions7 are decomposed by the data economy and come to be 
replaced by “automatic protention.” The data economy comes to usurp the 
industry of cultural goods, tying the cerebral with the cultural. This 
displacement is what Stiegler terms "disruption," a kind of disintegration that 
ushers in a "new kind of barbarism" inflamed by extreme disenchantment, the 
likes of which Adorno and Horkheimer described when surveying the effects of 
consumer capitalism at the end of the Second World War. "Purely and simply 
computational capitalism as such is the effective accomplishment and perfect 
completion of nihilism," the process that ecologically actualizes via the Earth's 
explicit destruction, which, over the last decade, has been termed the 
 
4 Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2019, p. 190. 5 Ibid., p. 229  6 Byung-Chul Han, In the Swarm: Digital Prospects, trans. Erik Butler, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2017. 7 “Protensions” are Stiegler’s description for anticipations that prompt new subject positions. Following 
Husserl’s phenomenological lexicon, “primary retentions” are sense perceptions, “secondary retentions” 
are memories, and “tertiary retentions” are media (as culture mnemonics, “tertiary retensions” can be 
further bifurcated as digital or analogue). 
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Anthropocene.8 
As control societies appeared towards the end of the consumerist epoch, 
they effectively guided the transition towards our hyperindustrial era. 
Automatic society has inflamed the destructive capture of attention and desire 
that characterized Deleuze’s description of noncoercive modulation exercised 
by control societies, passing through the mechanical liquidation of 
discernment.9 From data-mining sentiment analysis to prediction markets, 
today’s technologies are increasingly self-annotating and psycho-pathological, 
turning information into machine-readable data that can be mined. This is the 
inherently cybernetic character of control that Deleuze recognized when 
describing dividuation: discernment—which Kant associated with Verstand (“the 
understanding self”)—is automatized as an analytical power delegated to 
algorithms and executed through actuators and sensors, while outside of any 
intuition in the Kantian sense and, consequently, outside of any experience.  
By way of Deleuze and Peter Sloterdijk, Stiegler fills in Foucault’s macro-
political shortcomings, as Madness and Civilization credulously occluded the 
historical fact of marketing, which now serves “as the functional organization of 
innovation by disinhibition."10  Computational machines have grown to span 
continents and the “digital turn” has extended the cartographic purview of 
virtualization to the molar scale of smart cities, undersea cable networks, and 
satellite communication systems. Threading an arachnean network, or 
ecdemomaniac linealities,11 one can string together technical apparatuses as a 
cartographic labyrinth, or a “mania tabula,” virtualization understood as 
“boundless uncompressibility."12 Wherefore, Thomas Pringle remarks that 
 
8 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 38. 9 Bernard Stiegler, ‘For a Neganthropology of Automatic Society’, in Machine, Lüneberg, meson press, 
2019, pp. 25-49. 10 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 120. 11 Ecdemomaniac lineality being a neologism for the “wandering” and uncountable plurality of “lines of 
flight.” Fernand Deligny invokes such “wander lines” in his cartographic visual studies, visualizing that 
which eludes predictive control; see: Fernand Deligny, The Arachnean and Other Texts, trans. Drew S. Burke, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2013. 12 “Virtualization” upholds an appearance of seamless spatial entanglements, unlike Foucault’s 
“heterotopias.” For further discussion on “virtualization” as it relates to lossy/lossless compression, see: 
Alexander Galloway and Jason LaRivière, “Compression in Philosophy,” boundary 2, vol. 44, is. 1, 2017, p. 
131. 
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“[m]achines […] are inherently social devices. They never leave us alone.”13  
As Deleuze fundamentally linked the advent of control societies to 
marketing and the exploitation of affects via calculability to cybernetics, Stiegler 
appropriately reshapes biopower so that it is epochally fit for the twenty-first 
century, with probability calculation pooling and amortizing protentions. Thus, 
if we are to herald biopower’s regulatory prowess, we must concede that it now 
presupposes psychopower, which is invested in the immaterial and 
psychological realm.  
Thus, for Stiegler, any future thinking of the planet must necessarily be 
conceived of from the vantage of control’s psychologically imbued hold, the 
effects of which have become massive and destructive. The achievement of 
biopower gave life to infinitesimal surveillance and the clustering of descriptive 
information around denizens, heightening auto-constitutive paranoia and self-
surveillance through the administration of regulated bodies and the calculated 
management of life. Biopower sufficiently explains the folds of neurosis 
bedevilling the mid-to-late 20th century citizen. Foucault introduced the concept 
of “biopower” to help explain the power to interpret material objects as 
information, to affect objects at the statistical or informational level, not at the 
level of individual content. Psychopower, however, is globalized and diffracted, 
much like the flow of modulation, as it encompasses the systematic organization 
of the capture of attention made possible by the psychotechnologies that have 
developed with radio (1920), television (1950), and digital technologies (1990). 
Pychopower has burgeoned across the surface of our planet via reticulated 
circulation and variegated forms of networks and inter-net computational 
operations, producing a constant industrial channelling of attention and 
resulting in a new phenomenon: the massive destruction of attention, “referred 
to by nosologists in the United States as 'attention deficit disorder'.” This is 
exasperated by what Jonathan Crary calls “24/7 capitalism,” where generalized 
human life is inscribed into duration without breaks and defined by a principle 
of continuous functioning (and sleeplessness).14 
 
13 Thomas Pringle, ‘The Ecosystem is an apparatus: From machine ecology to the Politics of Resilience,’ 
Machine, Lüneburg, meson Press, 2019, p. 51. 14 Jonathan Crary, 24/7 Capitalism, London: Verso Books, 2013, p. 8. 
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THE PREINDIVIDUAL AND TRANSINDIVIDUAL 
This destruction of attention is particular to psychopower, rendering it both 
more subtle and severe than biopower, as it results in the destruction of libidinal 
energy. Conceived of as a positive force, “attention” indexes what Gilbert 
Simondon postulated qua the “reality of individuation,” as it is both psychic 
and collective. “Attention” is directed towards the psychic faculty that allows us 
to concentrate on a technical object or “give ourselves over to an object,” but it 
is also the “social faculty that allows us to take care of this object—or of 
another.” In other words, “attention” is the name of that civility that is 
grounded in philia (φιλία), or socialized libidinal energy, and directed towards 
technological artifacts. Thus, it is part of the inflected epiphylogenetic 
circulatory process—between collective genetic memory and individual 
psychological memory there is cultural memory. Amending Simondon’s work 
on technics, it is the articulation between the nervous, technical, and social 
systems which constitutes the total human fact. 
However, while Stiegler's account distinguishes between this tripartite 
interactive cycle, distinctly remarking on the place of the central nervous system 
(CNS), it occludes the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and, consequently, 
preception, apprehension, and reflexes. Stiegler's interest in drive-based 
exosomatization is inattentive to how technologies are also instinctually 
embedded, producing anatomo-behavioral polyphonic rhythms that emulate 
biological processes. As Brian Massumi's work on preemption in the late 1990s 
notes, the operative mode of (psycho)power characterizing postmodernity 
impinges on the body's autonomic responses.15 Our "digital brains"—Bayesian 
brains modelled on interference, simulated by probabilistic computers, and 
increasingly cultivated/synaptically shaped through repeated interactions with 
digital prostheses—reveal that plasticity is relative to automaticity and 
autonomic processes.16 
If dividuation reduces the subject to data-capture, “individuation” is 
normatively positive, allotting for the discovery of subjectivity. In the digital 
milieu, the possibility of collective individuation is formalized by participation in 
 
15 Brian Massumi, ‘Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption’, Theory and Event, vol 10, no. 2, 2007. 16 David Bates and Nima Bassiri, Plasticity and Pathology: On the Formation of the Neural Subject, New York, 
Fordham University Press, 2015, p. 22. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 220 
the formation of groups that constitute the horizon of existential protention and 
creative constraints. To facilitate this process, Stiegler poses that certain kinds of 
(technologically-directed) “confrontations” can be staged, on a contributory 
hermeneutic platform and in an online educational context.17 According to 
Stiegler’s account, φιλία (philia) is what binds together the members of a 
community and that which is torn apart when civilization degenerates, lapsing 
into barbarism. φιλία is also what prompts "transindividuation," an 
unconscious process of becoming-produced through multi-generational 
assemblages and circuits.  
Insofar as Stiegler’s theory of memory is concerned, the concept of the 
“transindividual” refers to the realm of culture and media, facilitating a 
collective closure with the cultural unconscious, through which language 
acquisition as well as familial ethnic, urban and other "protosocial” and 
“preverbal" traits are transmitted.18 Transindividual memory transits across 
individuals and generations, engaging within the cross-generational social 
sphere of non-verbal encoding. The transindividual emerges from the 
“transduction” of preindividual funds from an elemental, or “vital,” force, 
moving into a self-reflective and affective coupling of the individual with the 
collective.19 This process of “transduction” of the preindividual (“power of life”) 
invariably results in the specific individuation of the collective establishing a 
transindividual relationship that creates future possibilities, thus its ecological 
promise as a means of combatting the bleak future of the Anthropocene.  
Augmented with preindividual latencies and apeironic (indeterminate) flux, 
the individual cannot contain within themselves the latticework of preindividual 
forces constating the indeterminacy that, following Antoinette Rouvroy, Stiegler 
associates with “post-actuarial reality,” thus prompting a kind of inherent 
incompatibility or tautly-bound tension within the preindividual. As such, 
technical objects convert this overbrimming excess into analogue artifacts or, in 
 
17 Many of Stiegler’s projects, such as Ars Industrialis, Pharmakon.Fr, Plaine Commune Experiment and 
Internation.World aim to achieve a contributory economy while making use of trans-geographical virtual 
networks. The New Centre of Research & Practice, an experimental leftist-accelerationist virtual academic 
outlet that hosts an amalgam of critical theory seminars online, abides to a similar ethos. 18 Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana 
University Press, 1995, p. 67. 19 Richard Carlson, ‘Nietzsche’s Snowden: Tightrope Walking the Posthuman Dispositif’, Critical 
Posthumanism and Planetary Futures, ed. Debashish Banerji, San Francisco, CA, Springer, 2015, p. 64.  
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the contemporary case, digital flecks. This is how containment consolidates that 
which escapes probability (the excesses of the possible) as peripheral. Qua 
Simondon, the transindividual is psychosocial, for it is this “reality that the 
individuated being transports with him, this charge of being for future 
individuations."20 It is precisely the always-present charge of preindividuality, 
neither reducible to chronology nor history—though not disparate from 
either—which initiates and ensures that the individuated subject is prepared for 
the “second individuation,” its transindividuation, as it becomes grouped 
(networked/reticulated). Through transindividuation, one is grouped within the 
circuits of a milieu and subjectivized, a becoming-subjectified. This amounts to a 
process that metastabilizes and orders identification by weaving the “primordial 
narcissism” of the we into relays of collective inscription—as Badiou would 
claim, this is the domain of the event’s generic procedure. Through evental 
individuation, Simondon describes how "personality" is likewise formed, “which 
comprises, after structuration, an individual aspect and a complementary aspect 
of this individual.”21 
Such circuits of digital transindividuation have been manipulated by 
psychometric laboratories that are committed to scraping record levels of data. 
This was recently the case with Michal Kosiński and David Stillwell's selling 
access to pyschometric research data to Cambridge Analytica. Kosinski's and 
Stillwell’s Facebook application was based off of personality quizzes such as the 
Myers-Briggs test and this psychographic data proved alluring for 2016 
presidential primary candidates, ranging from Hillary Clinton to Ted Cruz and 
Donald Trump. 
The networked user, at once both individual and collective via shared 
psychical experiences, is mediated by social technology. As these networks 
follow the flux and flow of cybernetic circulation (modelled along adequation 
and relative to the unstable position of the observer), it results in a unique model 
of socialization, a secondary form of becoming-subjectivized idiosyncratic to 
 
20 For further reading on “post-actuarial reality,” which is "no longer about calculating probabilities" but, 
instead, deals with "how to account in advance for what escapes probability," see Antoinette Rouvroy and 
Bernard Stiegler, ‘The Digital Regime of Truth: From the Algorithmic Governmentality to a New Rule of 
Law’, trans. Anaïs Nony and Benoît Dillet, La Deleuziana, vol. 3, 2016, p. 8. For further reading on “future 
individuation,” see: David Scott, Gilbert Simondon's Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical Introduction and 
Guide, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Pres, 2014, p. 139. 21 Scott, Gilbert Simondon's Psychic and Collective Individuation, p. 139. 
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virtualization. According to Hyung Byung-Chul, due to virtualization’s lack of 
proximate spacio-temporal distinctions—the central tenets of Foucauldian 
disciplinary society’s regulation and administration of biopower—the 
distinctions between public and the private have become confused. Accordingly, 
“[d]igital communication is fostering this pornographic display of intimacy and 
the private sphere”—as social networks become “exhibition rooms” they shift 
the sites of information-production while rendering performative what was once 
considered highly private (fostering “icono-pornography”).22 Roland Barthes 
definition of the private sphere as “that zone of space, of time, where I am not 
an image, an object” has been thoroughly obscured by platform capitalism and 
the immaterial mediation of tracking devices and digital prostheses.23 Not only 
do no such zones exist within deep digitality’s transdividual circuitry, but a 
growing compulsive drive to publicly perform oneself online (and, 
consequentially, “on camera”) harmonizes with Capital, resulting in 
hystericisation, fomenting what Byung-Chul terms the “burnout society.” 
Today’s capitalist “proletarianization” describes a new precariat order of 
“knowledge workers,” mnemotechnically captured and industrially automated 
(noetic hymenoptera).24 Cognitive ergonomics comfortably seduce and produce the 
"perfect citizen consumer" who not only shops but, simultaneously, produces 
"good and meaningful data." The internet as such is a machine designed for the 
efficient, smooth and automated collection, transmission, and manipulation of 
information, with a legion of programmers and user interface (UI) designers 
intent on coding the best possible algorithms to carry out such “mental 
movement.” Furthermore, software agents play an increased role in the 
development of tracking through, for instance, the use of cookies, which not 
only record every online decision but tailor consumer suggestions while 
individually personalizing Google-search page ranks (“search engine 
optimization”).  
While today's reticulated society is based on the unfolding of rhythmic and 
periodic textures via smartphones and embedded mobile devices (GPS tags, 
cars, televisions, watches, and other prostheses)—fixed along mobile terminals 
 
22 Han, In the Swarm, p. 13. 23 ‘Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography’, trans. Richard Howard, New York, Hill 
and Wang, 1982, p. 15. 24 Stiegler, Machine, p. 36.  
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(the infrastructure and architecture of constant connectivity)—data-intensive 
computing's automatic power, a chrysalis parasitizing social relations, is the 
result of a century's ontogenesis, which we can separate into a ternate model.  
PROLETARIANIZATION 
Stiegler’s description of “proletarianization” corresponds to the loss of 
knowledge as savoir-faire (or “know-how”) and is part of tripartite historically-
contingent mold. The first dimension, the proletarianization of the producer, 
directly draws from Karl Marx's Fragments of  Machines; the worker's knowledge is 
inscribed in the machine, whereby specialization is reduced to a mere 
abstraction of activity.25 According to Thomas Moynihan, Marx didn’t quite 
envision modernization as formicating decerebration, but more as “the 
conquest of the external world by our neural innards,” or as the onward-
marching cognitive outpouching and noetic eversion of our control centres. 
Moynihan apportions “planetary environs” as “man’s inorganic body,” 
commenting that, for Marx, locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, and so 
forth were considered organs of the human brain, as they represented “the 
power of knowledge, objectified.”26 However, as the historical trajectory from 
the first moment of proletarianization to hyper-industrial postmodernity 
evinces, it is inorganic technical objects that eventually usurped noetic dreaming 
and displaced intellectual activity, binding noetic activity to Capital flow. This is 
the Marxian moment we are most familiar with: the loss of knowledge develops 
in tandem with the displacement of the artisan, as the worker’s guile is 
transferred to the machine. The worker is deprived of the capacity “to elevate 
himself above his condition and to individuate with others (through the process 
of coindividuation) and with technical objects.”27  
The second moment is that of the proletarianization of the consumer, which 
is determined through grammatization, or the technical history of memory —its 
material and spatial existence, or the “engraming” of temporal flow. This 
becomes something akin to the State science that forms what Deleuze and 
Guattari often remark as the “war machine”; recall that government science 
 
25 Karl Marx, Grundisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, London, Penguin Random House, 1973, p. 704. 26 Thomas Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism: A Secret History, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, p 77. 27 Benoît Dillet, ‘Proletarianization, Deproletarianization, and the Rise of the Amateur’, boundary 2, vol. 44, 
is. 1, 2017, p. 83. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 224 
funding generated the technologies underlying global positioning systems and 
internet communication and that a National Science Foundation grant allowed 
Sergey Brin and Larry Page to create the PageRank algorithm from which 
Google was erected. Here, commerce, rather than politics or machinery, 
becomes the forum for displacement28 and markets, rather than elections and 
legislatures, became the aggregators of preferences.  Grammatization explains 
the historical semblance of technical objects and their social inscription so that 
they can be reproduced, the formalization and transformation of knowledge 
occurring vis-a-vis gestures, speeches, and sensibilities. With Fordist 
industrialization, the rise of the consumer is in parallel with purchasing power, 
reconsidering the value of work and work of value; with “hyperconsumption,” 
individuals have become addicted to technical novelty.  
As political theorist Benoît Dillet aptly notes, the victim of the first form of 
proletarianization was the producer and, in particular, the industrial worker. 
Rather than an asylum, the privatization of the means of work configured the 
giant industrial “workhouse,” or factory, so that it was identified as a “House of 
Terror.”29 Distinguished by the Decade of Prosperity and post-World Warr II 
economic expansion, the second form of proletarianization has mainly affected 
the consumer, especially those members of the middle class who flocked to retail 
areas—“the department store and the supermarket, then the shopping center 
and the online retailer.”30  
The third form, “generalized proletarianization,” colors today’s epoch and 
is characterized by mass propagation. Generalized proletarianization is 
associated with the third industrial revolution’s virtual topography. Following 
the "first moment"—railway networks/the steam engine—and the “second”—
Taylor-Fordism, the oil and car industry—this “third industrial revolution” is, 
specifically, that of the financialization of society and debt, the rise of cognitive 
capitalism and the information economy, which is often termed post-Fordism. A 
survey of “generalized proletarianization” shows that there is no radical break 
underway, but, instead, a kind of hybridization with and intensification of the 
previous two socio-historical modes—algorithmic governmentality’s 
 
28 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media: How Facebook Disconnects Us and Undermines Democracy, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 122. 29 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, Scotts Valley, California, 2010, p. 388. 30 Dillet, Proletarianization, p. 86. 
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rift/fracture omits the critical veil of self-referential mystic subterfuge that 
accompanied the prior two epochal shifts. 
As such, “generalized proletarianization” is inherently affixed to what 
Walter Benjamin described in his penetrating 1921 posthumous fragment, 
"Capitalism as Religion." It was in this essay that Benjamin argued that 
capitalism does not only represent the secularization of the Protestant faith, as 
Max Weber had claimed, but that it is, simultaneously, essentially a religious 
phenomenon, which has developed as a parasitical mutualism with Christianity. 
According to Benjamin, capitalism is a “cultic religion” uninterested in ideation, 
atonement, or the expiation of guilt but aimed, instead, at creating guilt, itself.31 
As evidenced by capitalism’s conspiratorial admixture of “labor and the feast,” 
modern capitalism’s celebratory mode is invested in ludic play. Drawing on 
Benjamin’s essay, Giorgio Agamben deftly anchors Benjamin’s analysis in a 
historical index: August 16, 1971, the day that, under the presidency of Richard 
Nixon, the convertibility of the dollar into gold was suspended, evacuating 
money of any value that is not purely self-referential. Thus rang the death knell 
of the state's "exercise of monetary sovereignty."32 Granted, this lineage can be 
further traced back to fiduciary paper money assuming the role of credit by 
displacing metallic money, which was originally valued for its content of 
precious metal. However, after August 1971, money functioned as a credit both 
founded in, and corresponding to, itself and itself, solely. 
Consequently, “generalized proletarianization” invokes such invisible, albeit 
affectively charged, sites, which have, in an act of coincidental linguistic 
slippage, become epitomized by the “sites of the web” where we can locate 
today’s “digital panopticon.” Reliant on economies of data, digital industries 
function by tracking and capturing the activity of internet users, producing tacit 
information. The interconnected “internet of things” makes our environment 
predictable with the aid of artificial generalized intelligence (AGI), as these 
reticulated communicational technical instruments generate “places in the 
network” that “obey a temporality of their own.”33 This is a decentralized 
 
31 Walter Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’, trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, vol. 1: 1913–
1926, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 288–91. 32 Giorgio Agamben, Creation and Anarchy: The Work of Art and the Religion of Capitalism trans. Adam Kotso, 
Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2019, p. 67. 33 Florian Sprenger, Micro-Decisions, Lüneberg, meson press, 2015, p. 106. 
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process as, for instance, typified by Augur and Gnosis, the most well-known 
blockchain protocols, both of which utilize a suite of automated machine 
learning software that, in conjunction with decentralized supercomputers, 
facilitate prediction markets that serve as a foundation for a globally circulated 
“internet of things.” Not only do neural nets and machine learning bolster 
predictive analytics, but, as in the case of the “internet of things,” such 
apparatuses disconnect the user further from a product, mediating those 
nonvisible linealities that were precluded from meditation prior to reticulated 
“local communication” protocols.34 Conversational technology—Alexa, Siri, 
self-service checkout machines, and psychiatric therapist applications—
distinctly color industrial formation and predictive control as locutionary. Such 
information, which mediates processes and decisions, can be sourced from 
“direct process information” (also called “sematectonic information”), which 
emerges in and alongside mental/implicit activity. While interpersonal 
information can be exchanged, such transpersonal coordination is the product 
of mediation—thus a new socio-economic stasis has burgeoned vis-a-vis 
decentralized performed ontologies that cadger on neural plasticity.  
Much like the conversion of the pastoralist class reconstructed feudal 
peasants into tenant farmers and, subsequently, the capitalist class converted 
these aforementioned farmers into industrial workers, today’s “vectoralist class” 
has turned workers into information laborers through the privatization of 
vectors of communication.35 Bernard Stiegler examines the psychic affect of 
“generalized proletarianization” that is characteristic of the end of the 
Anthropocene, when it becomes the "age of disruption and the Entropocene," 
signalling "disintegration and annihilating knowledge."36 This “Entropocene” 
consists precisely in disintegrating and annihilating knowledge, paralleling 
entropy’s downwards cast of energy disintegration—the Anthropocene amounts 
to an "Entropocene" as it also accomplishes a kind of nihilism that levels 
communal values capable of prompting a "general economy" (a kind of 
energetic entropy heuristically signalling the decline of social buoyancy).  
 
34 Mercedez Bunz, The Internet of Things, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2017. 35 Accordingly, the vectoralist class "does not control land or industry anymore, just information. It does 
not claim its share of the surplus as rent or profit, but as interest." See: McKenzie Wark, Telesthesia: 
Communication, Culture and Class, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2012, p. 109.  36 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 210.  
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Over five billion terrestrial inhabitants are privy to the disruption of the data 
economy, given mobile telephony subscription statistics. Thus, Stiegler remarks 
that disruption is concretized by the unconsciously produced traces/metadata 
through which we ecologically annotate ourselves, enabled by automated 
glosses that "take over” and “short-circuit" our protentional potentials and, 
along with that, any possibility for interpretation, individuation, or 
hermeneutics. 
We can trace a lineage from theory of the mind to resilience politics while 
remarking that machines urgently necessitate recalibration vis-à-vis autonomous 
acting capacity, which is truly ecological. Through an entropic vantage of 
biomorphism we can also approach a viable reorientation of social institutions 
and machines recalibrated outside the parameters of economic growth. Doing 
so recovers Canguilhem from Foucault’s etymological grip, returning to the 
organic dispositif, or the apparatus as it is ecologically situated. Stiegler’s 
engagement with entropy and the Entropocene considers both the social and 
natural ecosystem as an organic formation, upholding that organisms’ and 
social technologies’ coevolution must be met with technical individuation 
devoid of capitalist coordinates. 
One such provocation is not to return to a kind of idealism but to revisit 
Foucault's psychological misattributions while reinstituting something akin to 
Canguilhem's methodology of hyperstitial genealogy. Today, psychopower is 
bound in a historically fettered dynamic relationship between madness and 
psychiatric power; psychopower not only problematizes Foucault’s conception 
of biopower and disciplinary society but Foucauldian exclusionary madness as 
well. Recall that in History of  Madness Foucault’s project was to genealogically 
delineate how Western society, from the seventeenth century, radically opposes 
reason and “unreason” (madness). However, within the Greek philosophical 
tradition until Montaigne ⁠—and even Pascal—madness (folly) irreducibly 
belongs to thinking: it is, in fact, constitutive of the faculty of thinking.37 
Psychopower provides us a means of redrafting madness/folly as a dimension of 
noesis qua the faculty of thinking, both intellectually and spiritually. 
Just as machines were once conceived of as extensions of inner organs and 
 
37 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Dreams and Nightmares: Beyond the Anthropocene Era’, trans. Daniel Ross, 
Alienocene: Journal of the First Outernational, vol. 5, June 2019, p. 2. 
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the central nervous system (a generalized organology of pure externalization)—
a philosophical-anthropology genealogy that runs from Ernst Kapp to Arnold 
Gehlen and Marshall McLuhan—Stiegler conceives of madness as the 
externalization of hubris (ὕϐρις) and noetic thinking, incepted with the dream. 
However, today we recognize that externalization/exosomatization is no longer 
sufficient—as Gertrud Koch notes (and as demonstrated by predictive 
processing and convolutional “neural networking”), our media paradigm-shift 
has divulged that machines are, in fact, agents in a field of techniques and part 
of a network of relations, which are often pathologically distorted, indexing how 
economic calculations convert the machinic function from mechanical-technical 
to perceptual-economic.38  
Consider prehistorian Marc Azéma's account of "Man," the animal who 
"has always 'dreamed’"—according to Azéma, what distinguishes humans is 
that our "brain is a machine for producing images [...] capable of projecting his 
inner 'cinema' outside himself."39 Both cinema and grammatization begin under 
the cave’s penumbra—with Upper Palaeolithic rupestrian rock paintings—as 
these are the hypomnesic sites of “(pre)cinematic projection” where 
exosomatization constitutes an arche-cinema. Stiegler terms "technesis" the 
exteriorization process of dreaming, however, in our epoch of deep digitality 
 
38 One marked example of this rift is the inception of the “virtual camera,” as in the case of the Simulcam, 
which uses performance capture to facilitate the input of digital characters and set extensions (so as to 
produce and predictively model real-time, low-resolution composites of data, live-action footage and 
computer-generated characters and environments). Software such as the Simulcam extend beyond the 
purview of “motion capture” while topographically actualizing virtualization, making it compossible for 
digital characters to interact with live actors and environments, as in the case of Andy Serkis’ role as 
Gollum in the Lord of the Rings film trilogy (2001–3) and in The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012). 
Consequently, optical technologies engaged in bilocalization or colocalization are perceptually limited 
within necessary aesthetic, perceptual, and sensorimotor conditions upon which the possibility of 
probabilistic perception re: external objects is rested. Consolidating “deep entrenchment,” in the case of 
the Simulcam we see that distinctively proximate feedback is diffracting during visual projection, and that 
the topological richness (or lack thereof) of these models means that they simultaneously produce errant 
traces as "blind spots” (de-grammatization). For further discussion on the “virtual camera,” see: Gertrud 
Koch, ‘Animation of the Technical and the Quest for Beauty’, Machines, Lüneburg: meson press, 2019, p. 
7. For further discussion on the “Simulcam” see Hye Jean Chung, Media Heterotopias: Digital Effects and 
Material Labor in Global Film Production, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2018, p. 82. For further 
discussion on “deep entrenchment” and proximate feedback, see Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2018, p. 164. 39 Marc Azéma, La Préhistoire du cinéma: Origines paleolithiques de la narration graphique et du cinématographe, Paris, 
Errance, 2001, p. 21. 
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and hyper-control, this is an inflected process whereby exteriorized dreams 
produced ashen traces. Committed to constructing order out of noise, 
computational capitalism and probabilistic algorithmic governmentality treat 
these vestiges as waste, yet these traces are culturally assumed—in the case of 
deep digitality, the multiplexed perceptual faculties of performance capture, 
“elastic bunch graph matching” facial recognition technologies, and 3D game-
views are made noetic, parasiting our memory, cognition, and imagination 
alike. Thus, not only is the collective closure between the transcendental 
imagination and schematism the impetus for tertiary retentions/media artifacts 
but, also, the nexus for dreams’ contrary motion, simultaneously interiorized 
and externalized. 
This is, in fact, because media objects are not simply extensive but agential 
and optical mechanisms, as Freidrich Kittler recognized when considering the 
camera obscura as the nexus of mediated representation. As a device for 
automatically recording images, the camera obscura functioned as a first-order 
simulation, allowing for a kind of visually precluded “reality” to appear on a 
wall; however, Kittler’s “hardware realism” has to be contextualized alongside 
techno-organic processes of observation. Drawing from the Copenhagen 
Interpretation and phenomenology of quantum behavior, for instance, we know 
that observation never shows a particle in a mixed state or in more than one 
location—observation only seems to resolve the indeterminacy in atomic systems. 
What is called the “observer-effect” cannot be discounted—for the observer 
and/or instruments of observation, which have non-trivial effects on that which 
they observe. This is what François Laruelle’s metaphysics of the Real shows 
us—the Real is like “Schrödinger’s cat” in the sense that it encompasses a 
multiplicity of states in a unified theory. Through observation, the Real as One 
is seen from the perspective of what Laruelle calls the "Vision-in-One," or 
immanently, while realizing that the Real is foreclosed to full epistemic access. 
Extending observation’s agential charge to technical media, we see that 
artifacts’ being-networked means they are intensive and extensive, producing 
inflected non-trivial effects and, in our case, seeping into dreams.  
ORDINARY MADNESS 
 It is on the status of the dream, which we can consider in lieu of Descartes’ 
“metaphysical hypothesis” in Meditations, where Foucault and Derrida once 
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vehemently disagreed. In History of  Madness, Foucault argues that Descartes 
separates reason from madness while structurally attaching this to a historical 
observation: for Foucault, Descartes is the pivot point of the radical separation 
of reason from unreason as he published Meditations in 1641, just predating the 
“great confinement” of 1656, which saw the creation of the Hôpital Général in 
Paris. It was here where the mad were confined and the moment where 
Foucault locates Western modernity’s sociological perturbation, as medical 
confinement replaces the leper houses of the Middle Ages. The mad and 
deviant were confounded together, as the "spontaneous elimination of the 
'asocial.'"40  
Derrida's 1963 criticism of Foucault, "Cogito and the History of Madness" 
questions the precedence of this historical departure. Recalling Descartes, 
Derrida underscores that it is both the suspension of belief/experience of 
hyperbolic doubt and the supposition of “total madness” that produces 
Descartes’ hypothesis of the meddling “evil genius,” contorting perception-cum-
belief. Derrida poses that the dream can be considered as an attenuated form of 
madness—meditation being, itself, a kind of waking dream. Descartes’ 
hypothesis that he is dreaming is a methodological postulate which advances 
that, regardless of whatever suppositional terms are co-opted, certain world-
beliefs—mathematical and geometrical principles, or those analytic a priori 
beliefs that, for Kant, deal with space and time—remain indubitable. Thus, for 
Derrida, it is not madness that is excluded but sensory illusion: “madness is only 
a particular case, and, moreover, not the most serious one, of the sensory 
illusion which interests Descartes at this point.”41 
Stiegler, drawing from Descartes' Rules for the Direction of  the Mind,42 posits 
that in order to direct thought we must exteriorize it, making it an object of a 
form of attention. The realization of dreaming is coincident with the 
exteriorization of representation—therefore, Cartesianism is a cartographic 
theory of points, lines, and linealities. For Stiegler, this process is artificial, 
 
40 Michel Foucault, History of Madness trans. Jonathan Murphy, London, Routeledge, 2006, p. xixx. 41 Jacques Derrida, ‘Cogito and the History of Madness,’ Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London: 
Routledge, 1978, p. 50. 42 “It is generally helpful if we draw these figures and display them before our external senses. In this way 
it will be easier for us to keep our mind in a state of attention.” See René Descartes, ‘Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind’, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 65. 
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technical, and exosomatic, dealing with making memorization reproducible. In 
fact, given the tenuous nature of memory, retentional finitude can be overcome 
through grammatization, beginning with the practice of analytical 
representational exteriorization (cave paintings) and inscription (writing). 
 According to Crary’s account, cognitive capitalism’s disempowerment is not 
simply the incapacitation of dreaming but also the impairment of “any mode of 
absent-minded introspection that would otherwise occur in intervals of slow or 
vacant time.”43 Accordingly, Crary’s analysis poses that we have devolved into 
passive automatons open to manipulation or behavioral management. Stiegler 
uses hypercontrol to describe this generalized automatization, whereby the noetic 
faculties of deliberation are short-circuited by digital tertiary retentions,44 
amending the “control-through-modulation” model put forth by Deleuze. It is 
the haunting of dreams and perturbation of technical memory, both exterior 
and interior, contra-agential, that we must underscore. 
PROBABILISTIC DREAMING 
In In the World Interior of  Capital, Peter Sloterdijk describes the opening of 
modernity as a propensity to madness and a willingness to embrace delusion: 
“[s]overeignty belongs to the one who decides on flattening.”45 As evidenced by 
the Anthropocene’s crises, the postmodern psychopathology par excellence is 
increased risk-taking, which Stiegler terms the intensification and permanent 
excitation of hubris (ὕϐρις). Through Sloterdijk, Stiegler allows us to see the 
genesis of psychotechnologies,46 which seep through consumerist capitalism and 
deluge hyper-control society. In cognitive capitalism, the reshaped and 
psychotechnologized manifestation of organology is neuropower, which works 
to “produce changes in the material logics of the brain by affecting the brain's 
neurons and synapses.”47 As opposed to biopower, neuropower concerns the 
 
43 Crary, 24/7, p. 99. 44 According to Stiegler, during the nineteenth century, mechanical tertiary retention defined 
proletarianization; during the twentieth century, analog tertiary retention fulfilled this role. The current 
operator of “generalized proletarianization” is digital tertiary retention. 45 Peter Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital for a Philosophical Theory of Globalization, trans. Wieland 
Hoban, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2017, p. 101. 46 Including video games, computers, SMS, and other such factors of today’s “culture industry.” 47 Warren Neidich, ‘Neuropower: Art in the Age of Cognitive Capitalism’, The Psychopathologies of Cognitive 
Capitalism: Part One, ed. A. De Boever and W. Neidich, Berlin, Archive Books, 2013, p. 228. 
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ways and means that capitalism intervenes upon the neuroplasticity of the 
brain; neuropower produce changes in the material logics of the brain 
(synapses) via the reconstitution of working memory (protension), rather than 
simply modulating memories of the past (secondary retention). The transhuman 
mental endosomatic condition has become entropic, fulfilling the inhuman48 as a 
denial of negentropic possibilities—a denial of noetic freedom and agency 
accompanies “deep digitality,” with total automation reaching a threshold of 
disruptiveness. Neural entrainment is reduced to firmware, pruned and nested 
within algorithmic governmentality.   
Stiegler associates the theoretical core of transhumanism with “the metaphysics 
of  absolutely computational capitalism,” bearing within it the "ultra-liberal-cum-
libertarian project."49 Protracting Stiegler’s thought, there subsists a coeval 
arche-cinematic cognitive condition in our thought, cognition rearranging the 
montages of psychic and collective retentions and protentions, whereby 
secondary retentions—the representational content of memories and dreams—
are probabilistically pooled. Not just dreaming but anticipatory cognition 
(protension) and the transcendental imagination, too, become imagistically tied 
to psychotechnologies and reticulated media-images. In the age of disruption, 
endosomatic self-knowledge, understood as what Socrates called anamnesis,50 is 
amortized by exosomatic stupefaction, catastrophes, and disorientation.  
For Stiegler, we occupy an epoch of reticulated and automated disruption 
where a "new kind of barbarism" is induced by existential loss, generalizing 
what Emile Durkheim called anomie, the malady of the infinite. Stiegler points to 
terrorism and sociological case studies of isolated and suicidal dividuals, such as 
Richard Durn and Andreas Lubitz, to proffer how the key pharmacological 
 
48 “Inhuman” in Whitehead’s terms, whereby human beings risk a relapse/decay into simpler forms as a 
result of a lack of awareness. 49 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 97. 50 “Anamnesis,” as a recollective process of remembrance, represents “direct dialogical interaction” 
without having to rely on any kind of external scaffolding. As part of today’s military technics, anamnesis is 
denuded of techne and exerts ontic cartographic containment, written into the (perceptual/optical) 
functionality and political utility of targeting and imaging systems (e.g. drone warfare). This is contrasted to 
"hypomnesis," the making-technical of memory via substitutes and externalizations such as writing, 
photography, machines, etc.; "hypomnesis," the pharmacological condition of anamnesis, is actively 
constructed through techne. For further consideration, see: Allen Feldman, Archives of the Insensible: Of War, 
Photopolitics, and Dead Memory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2015 p. 188; Also see: Alexander 
Galloway, French Theory Today, The Public School, New York, 2010, p. 5.” 
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questions in our “epoch of disruption” involve how the technological powers 
that we lionize as "civilizational progress" become transfigured as weapons of 
destruction, revealing a dormant subterranean barbarism. Disruption, 
constantly outstripping and overtaking social organization, renders the will 
obsolete in advance, thereby destroying reason (understood as rational 
knowledge).  
ECO-CRISES 
Our becoming-panicked and social hysteria is perhaps best evinced by 
today’s most apparent and variegated indices, including: scientific anticipations 
that demonstrate the metasystemic crises established as the Anthropocene (cf. 
the Meadows Report);51 initiatives such as “Biosphere 2,” a project (bolstered by 
Steven Bannon) in Arizona that seeks to grow commercial crops in CO2-rich 
atmospheres, which are premised on the ecosystem’s failure, or “disaster 
capitalism”; sentiments such as those of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who 
recently told diplomats at a meeting of the Arctic Council in Finland that the 
rapidly warming Arctic region will present abundant economic opportunities 
for offshore resources like gas, oil, uranium, gold, and rare earth minerals. This 
is accompanied by: an increasing general economic insolvency, of which 2008 
was the first shockwave; the rise of sentiment analysis and metadata collection; 
an increase in "new forms of barbarism" vis-a-vis racially motivated violence 
(e.g. Dylann Roof in Charleston, or Yassin Salhi in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier); 
the explosion of opioid addiction in the United States; and the rise of 
reactionary neolibertarian ideologies amongst disaffected liberals (producing the 
“alt-right” and Mencius Moldbug and Nick Land's “Dark Enlightenment”).  
According to Stiegler, if there is to be a viable future, the economy-to-come 
will be that of practical and functional noetic differentiation—such is the 
Neganthropocene’s noetic functor. Stiegler prompts a rediscovery of tekhnē, 
where new therapies of pharmaka accompany the rediscovery of dreaming. As 
the exteriorization of the content of dreams, mental perception (noesis) is also a 
technesis (thus, the perceptual noetic faculty is the site of primeval arche-
cinema). In contrast to informatic calculative thinking, however, Stiegler 
 
51 Donella H Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III. Limits to 
Growth, New York, Signet, 1972. 
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prompts the exteriorization of the contents of dreams and their realization to be 
guided towards "meditative thinking," whereby reason exceeds quantitative 
calculation, thus opposing the automated gradient of “calculated thinking.” 
On tele-science and techno-ecology, Derrida commented that the quickly 
approaching world of "law without justice" would oblige us to examine the 
virtualization of space and time alongside the possibility of virtual events whose 
movement and speed would prohibit us more than ever. However, 
virtualization, co-opted by monetization qua actuarial derivative markets, 
produces something much more akin to active informationalism’s objective-
driven providential recourse. Anthropologist Davor Loeffler notes that the 
projected scenarios of a 2°, 3°, or 6° increase of global warming will produce 
entirely different future worlds. Thus, these scenarios or process continua are 
not virtual, but objective, for “they are the recursive abstraction of the linear 
continuum condensed in single modules as processes of becoming, which can be 
coupled and exchanged like objects, as the emissions trading proves.”52 
 This economy requires a shift from anthropology to neganthropology, 
where the latter is founded on the pharmacological use of new media 
apparatuses to produce a threat to hominization, which André Leroi-Gourhan 
described as the processual conquest of space and time through its 
technicization. In Stiegler’s description of neganthropology, however, a 
conspicuous problem arises concerning how to evaluate or measure negentropy. 
Stiegler lifts the term "negentropy" from Erwin Schrödinger's "negative 
entropy”53 and what physicist Francis Bailly and mathematician Giuseppe 
Longo term “anti-entropy.” According to Stiegler, negentropy is "always 
described in relation to a locality in time as well as in space [...] it differentiates 
a more or less homogenous space."54 While Stiegler often makes passing 
mention of Longo's work, this is the most detail that he provides us, leaving the 
inquisitive reader demanding elaboration. Nonetheless, Longo's quantitative 
work on the isomorphic evolution of our perceptual systems bears closer 
attention, so that we may better account for hominization as it relates to 
 
52 Davor Loeffler, ‘Distributed Potentiality’, Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, vol. 15, no. 1-2, 
2018, p. 38. 53 In computation and physics, ‘neganthropy’ refers to 'available energy', rather than dissipated energy 
(entropy). 54 Stiegler, Machine, 44. 
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orientation, locomotory actions, and perceptual invariances. 
LONGO AND COMPUTATION 
According to Longo, large computing systems, such as banking systems, are 
based on real-time interaction with their environment. However, a certain 
gradient of dynamicity is introduced by interactive interpreters, as in the case of 
Object-Oriented Languages.55 Longo’s description of a “double loop control 
system” asserts there is a “phase space” of economic activity and a second loop 
at the allostatic level that inhibits the changing phase space.56 Longo does not 
believe that the question of continuity and discreteness is a purely 
epistemological question inaccessible to ontological query. Thus, Longo's thesis 
sharply conflicts with the classic model of the Church-Turing thesis, which 
poses the two as absolutely unique. In his unpublished essay, Intelligent Machinery, 
Alan Turing writes of a p-type machine (p being an anachronism for pain or 
pleasure) with different means of signal differentiation; in Turing’s model, sense 
stimuli function as “trigger circuits,” or switches, which organize randomly 
distributed memory units to provide a systematic form of finite memory.57 In 
contrast to Turing’s discretization, Longo does not oppose digitally continuous 
computation, both for humans and machines. Instead, we can think of the body 
at different moments according to different paradigms because the body is 
nothing but interactions with other bodies (some qualitative, some quantitative).  
What does this mean for exosomatic technical artifacts as they configure 
generative processes? As Longo demonstrates how dynamicity is introduced by 
“interpreters,” the “reflective property” of machines is accordingly "extended 
by interaction,"58 allowing for us to affect automated decision-making systems 
through decision-guidance techniques that are preferred by the "choice 
architect." Such "soft" forms of design-based control, called "nudging," alter 
people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
 
55 Giuseppe Longo, ‘The Difference between Clocks and Turing Machines’ Functional Models of Cognition. 
Theory and Decision, ed. A. Carsetti, vol. 27, Springer, 1999, p. 12. 56 Giuseppe Longo, ‘Extended criticality, phase spaces and enablement in biology’, Emergent Critical Brain 
Dynamics, ed. April A. Benasich and Urs Ribary, vol. 55, 2013, pp. 64-79 57 Alan Turing, ‘Intelligent Machinery’, The Essential Turing ed. B. Jack Copeland, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, pp. 395-433. 58 Longo, ‘The Difference Between Clocks’, 12. 
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significantly changing their economic incentives.59 As demonstrated by recent 
research in design-based regulatory techniques, this proves for a 
pharmacological co-option of information-processing hardware, which is 
irreversibly armed with the capabilities of sifting, sorting and interrogating vast 
quantities of data via bioprospecting. Digital machines, which "execute 
commands with identical repetition,"60 assert the terms of hypercontrol society’s 
“fixed exchange rates”61 and deep digitality’s multiplicity of points of view and 
matrices of vision. “Within deep digitality the subject is cellular”62 and cognition 
is externalized as machanosensory feedback, feeding our multiplexed mental 
images as determined world-perception. To reinstate the human means to 
confer digital decision-guidance processes, where the targeted individual makes 
relevant decisions, contrasted to mechanically-determined and automated 
action-forcing/coercive design. Such is the prowess of Longo’s work, which 
heralds continuous communication systems that privilege the observer (or 
“choice architect”). 
DIGITAL FLECKS AND OPTICS 
If photography, phonography, and cinema produced analogue vestiges in 
the twentieth century,63 inextricably linked to their materiality, their 
electromagnetic circulation foretold of a kind of synchronization that Leroi-
Gourhan described as characteristic of the "programme industries.”64 
Presciently foretelling of the algorithmic probabilism typifying user and item-
based data packet inspection, "nearest neighbor algorithms,” and "implicit data 
collection," as early as 1965, Leroi-Gourhan described a "magnetic library” 
(magnétothéque),65 armed with “electronic selection”: 
"[t]he preservation of thought can now be envisaged otherwise than in 
 
59 Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’, Information, 
Communication and Society, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 118-36. 60 Giuseppe Longo, ‘Critique of Computational Reason in the Natural Sciences’, Fundamental Concepts in 
Computer Science, 2009, p. 14. 61 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript for Societies of Control’, Negotiations 1972-1990, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2014, p. 180. 62 Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 69. 63 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 37 64 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1964. 65 Ibid., p. 349 
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books, which will not for long possess the advantages of quick and easy 
manageability. Preselected and instantaneously reconstituted information will 
soon be delivered by a huge magnetic library with electronic selection."66 
Artificial content-based filtering, from recommender systems to information 
retrieval, gesture towards de-symbolization—the industrial dispositif 
constituting its exteriorization through pooled arche-traces of memory, rather 
than analogue vestiges. However, what is often missing from discourse on 
digitality and machines is how deep digitality is optical. Even in the case of data 
packet inspection, at any given node, the upper layers have to be exposed in 
order for a packet to be distributed further, because these layers contain 
transportation-oriented data; differentiation is based on perceptual values.  
As Leroi-Gourhan demonstrates, digitality and digital thinking precede 
digital technologies. Drawing from the metaphysical distinction between essence 
and instance, Galloway affirms that digitality simply entails a basic distinction: 
"whether zeros and ones or some other set of discrete units—the four 
nucleobases of the genetic code or the twenty-six letters of the alphabet—are 
just as digital as the base-two numeric encoding used in binary computers.”67 
Thus, much like perception, there is a kind of "fundamental hybridity" that 
results from this description of digitality. This is integral to what Leroi-Gourhan 
calls the process of exteriorization and what Bernard Stiegler, following the 
analyses of Alfred Lotka, calls exosomatization. Here, hybridity (Yϐρις) 
characterizes the realities that surround us and constitute us, as they are always 
doubled: realities are chimeras and artefactual mixtures of heterogenous 
realities. Thus, hybridity is also an aesthetic and technical notion, with the 
human at the center, functioning via continuous perceptual interference.  
Fredrich Kittler inaugurated the termed psychophysics to describe the new 
technological media stored in the "discourse network of 1900" based on 
randomness and combinatorics. Where Kittler’s "1800 kingdom of sense" 
corresponded to Foucault's sovereign societies and biopolitics, Kittler’s "1900 
kingdom of pattern," based on images and algorithms, corresponds to Deleuze's 
control society, though Kittler stalks this development’s proleptical 
 
66 Ibid., p. 404. 67 Galloway, Against the Digital, p. xix. 
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conception.68 Kittler chooses the epochal period of 1900 specifically because of 
the development of the phonograph and typewriter, where the ability to record 
sense-data technologically shifted: "[f]or the first time in history, writing ceased 
to be synonymous with the serial storage of data [...] the real entered into 
competition with the symbolic."69 However, Kittler’s description omits that this 
transformation is not only the conversion of matter into code, or the passage 
from the qualitative to the quantitative, but, instead, a progression from the 
non-aesthetic to the aesthetic. This transition, which Lacan recognized as 
integral to the castrative “mirror stage,” also facilitates the development from 
nonmedia to media, politicizing life while converting representability into an 
aesthetic object.70 Thus, while the Real remains foreclosed (despite Kittler’s 
insistence), observation and perceptual faculties reinscribe the human-as-centre. 
CONCLUSION 
Stiegler does not settle into the lofty seat of prognostication, as he advocates 
for applying “negative entropy” to the Anthropocene by inspiring a media-
ecological relationship birthed from the commons so as to evade ecological 
disasters that include rising water levels, global warming, and increasing CO2 
levels in the atmosphere. The aforementioned “choice architect” must be 
directed outwards, which situates epistemophilia’s social fulcrum. From Plaine 
Commune, Stiegler’s recently inaugurated “contributory learning territory,” to 
the 2020 League of Nations macroeconomic "Internation.World" initiative, 
Stiegler advocates for direct political and legislative action.  
Following Stiegler, “tertiary retentions,” whether they be mechanic, 
analogue, or digital, are pharmacological—a phenomenon that is both poison 
and cure, introducing both emancipatory possibilities and newfound 
repressions. Stiegler’s work is not terribly specific about what programs or 
technologies he finds most promising for pharmacological appropriation, which 
I have attempted to resolve. Granted, surveying surveillance and meta-data 
capture, Stiegler recognizes that the internet allows for the possibility of open-
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source “free software,”71 stimulating new subject positions; this makes 
compossible the process of “individuation” as an uncompressed trial of 
becoming that is “structurally unachievable and in this sense infinite.”72 
Nonetheless, we must also recognize the limits of such thought, recalling the 
imprudence of the California Ideology and Harry Halpin’s unabashed and, at 
times, naïve utopian optimisms.73  
If it is not “open source everything” as the freeing of prostheses that we 
ought to seek when reclaiming digital tertiary retention-cum-protension, where 
ought we seek such alternatives? In The Cybernetic Hypothesis Part IV, the French 
anarchist collective Tiqqun describes the “conversion of human relations into 
an ecology of data points that can be tweaked and controlled but remains self-
stabilizing,”74 anticipating such calculation. Tiqqun's “hypothesis” refers to a 
specific epistemological regime in which systems or networks combine both 
human and nonhuman agents in mutual communication, dominating the 
production and regulation of society and culture. Etymologically identifying 
cybernetics with the Greek term kubernèsis (to “pilot” or “steer”), Tiqqun likens 
cybernetics to control society’s petrol. Ever-militant, Tiqqun claims “we want to 
disrupt the piloting of this ship, to take what detritus is usable and leave the rest 
to sink in the rising oceans,”75 and provides a strategy: block the circuits (offline 
and online).  
Tiqqun cites the 2011 blockade of the Port of Oakland and of ports up and 
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down the Western Coast in the United States, the Argentine Piqueteros 
Unemployed Workers Movements (Movimientos de Trabajadores Desempleados), 
Julien Coupat and Tarnac Nine’s sabotage of French train lines, Occupy Wall 
Street, and Idle No More’s ongoing indigenous-led rail blockades in Canada. 
An inversion of Paul Virilio’s “Total War,” Tiqqun’s position draws on 
corporeal networks and the flux of flow. Echoing the sentiments in Wolfgang 
Iser’s The Act of  Reading, Tiqqun indicates that non-sequential "virtual work” 
occurs at the intersection of objective specifications that the text, itself, 
divulges—for Iser and Tiqqun, alike, the manifesto produces a necessarily 
political aesthetic response.76 Such a hermeneutic approach poses 
intermediality-as-pharmakon, giving rise to a new range of tactical media, 
which we have seen in our own epoch via RedHack and Anonymous’ 
hacktivism, Chelsea Manning’s whistleblowing, and Wikileaks’ leaking 
confidential internal documents. 
While politically promising, Tiqqun’s strategy only takes us so far. 
Considering that cybernetics has culturally calcified into what Deleuze and 
Guattari termed lines of "rigid segmentarity,”77 or normative stasis, to rupture 
its reticulated feedback-based circulation with (virtual) "blockages" simply does 
not seem to be a terribly viable approach. For instance, distributed denial-of-
service attacks (DDoS) frequently lapse into symptomatic and palliative 
solutions for structurally-ingrained problems—the nodes and edges of 
protocological control, rooted in the riven technical specifications of TCP/IP 
and DNS. Despite Gabriella Coleman attributes a political precedent to DDoS 
hacks such as Anonymous’ “Project Chanology” provocation against the 
Church of Scientology, these often amount to little more than what Critical Art 
Ensemble aptly describes as “monumental counterspectacle” that aims to 
compete with the "bunker of power's" symbolic order. This is not to suggest that 
hacktivism cannot prompt transindividuation—when hacktivism “seeks to 
undermine the symbolic order with more ephemeral, process-oriented 
methods,”78 producing nomadic resistance through temporary autonomous 
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zones, it can target structurally-directed resistance formations. One prominent 
such example is Turkish Marxist-Leninist hacktivist group RedHack’s 2014 
breach into the Soma Electricity Production company, cancelling 1.5 million 
liras (approx. 650K US dollars) of denizens’ debt.  We must constitute new, 
politically galvanized and post-hermeneutic active lines of flight over the pre-
existent ones, ensuring that these are informed by epistemophilic philia (φιλία) 
and intended for the commons. 
As the conditions of nihilism and dejection appear more and more akin to a 
kind of “general madness,” normalized ad infinitum, madness has transmutated 
into an invisible phantasm, haunting and paralyzing our social impulse to 
transindividuate. Alas, perhaps we cannot extricate ourselves from automation’s 
impersonal traumas and our media ecology’s probabilistic binder, yet the 
fulsome debris and oil wafting and pooling on the ocean’s epipelagic crust 
indicate that generalized dejection is certainly unsustainable. If nothing else, the 
digital turn ought to caution us that that which is embedded is not necessarily 
visible and that which is perceptual can not be reduced to a disclosure of “the 
Real.” As the role of epistemic and epistemological transitions, 
transindividuation can be made actualizable through continuous priming via 
human intervention. A mastery of coding and computation, of theory and 
contributory praxis, is desperately needed if we are to fit new lines of flight and 
pathways over hypercontrol society’s circuits. By modifying and specifying 
Stiegler’s account, I have tried to mend the marriage of hardware realism and 
software agentialism, of media exosomatization with inflection. I am in 
agreement with Stiegler that transindividuation can solely be achieved through 
the commons, though we must be uncompromisingly specific. What do we 
mean by “the commons”? Rather than goods or resources held in common, 
such "commons" must be regarded as a dynamic system of social relations, or 
what Massimo De Angelis calls "doing in common."79 This is the pure power of 
φιλία (philia), metastablization through circuits of transindividuation, through 
which reason is "conceived not as ratio, but as affect."80  
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